Something I mentioned in last week’s newsletter but didn’t go over in much detail was Trevor Zegras being a player who could produce more goals than he is expected to because of his strength as a passer. By that, I mean he is a player who isn’t on the ice for a high quantity of scoring chances, but a higher percentage of them go in because of the type of plays he is either setting up or finishing.
I showed this chart in the post, but here it is again for a refresher.
The stats I want to focus on are passes from the center lane, high danger assists & shots off high danger assists and one-timers. I referred to these as high percentage plays in my last post because shots coming off these types of passing plays have a higher shooting percentage at five-on-five compared to the league average. It’s not end-be-all by any means, but it can show how some players might be able to outperform some of their projections.
Zegras is one I want to bring up in particular because we can compare stats across models to show some of this happening in action. The best way to showcase this is on Micah Blake McCurdy’s HockeyViz site where we can look at the quality of chances Anaheim created with Zegras on the ice along with his impact on both finishing & setting up goals.
Zegras is a solid driver of offense, but his goal-scoring & playmaking has been in the upper echelon of the league going by Micah’s model. He’s also had a positive impact on Goals For going by Evolving Wild’s RAPM stat as well. Looking at where the shots are coming from when he’s on the ice is part of the story. The hot zone really directly in front of the net but more between the faceoff circles and in the high slot.
We can cross-reference this with some of the A3Z data mentioned earlier to get a glimpse at why we get some of these results, as Zegras rates well at creating from the middle of the ice and making cross-slot passes. It doesn’t completely explain the results, but provides us with a good starting point.
I thought this would be a good time to touch base on some of the passing stats collected from the past season, now that we have a decent sample of games tracked. There’s a lot that we already know about this data, but there are a couple of new layers that I want to expand upon. Mostly because we know that creating these high danger plays lead to more goals, but how to create them gets kind of lost.
That, and it’s always good to revisit the basics.
2022-23 High Danger Passing Quick Facts:
Shooting Percentage on High Danger Passes last year was 15.7% at 5v5, increased to 20.9% for shots on goal.
Sh% on Cross-slot Passes was 21.2%, increased to 27.6% for shots on goal.
Sh% on passes from the Center Lane (between faceoff circles) in offensive zone was 10.9%, increased to 16.2% for shots on goal.
Sh% on passes from behind the net were 11%, increased to 14.9% if they were on goal.
Passes from the center lane occurred almost twice as often as Cross-Slot passes & 58% more often than passes from behind the net.
50% of Cross-slot Passes & 44% of Center Lane Passes occurred off the rush
Sh% on Cross-Slot plays off the rush was 23% compared to 19.1% on forecheck.
There is a lot that hasn’t changed since Ryan Stimson’s initial findings back in 2015-16 (I’m old and am bad at remembering the exact year). We know passing has an impact on shooting percentage & has a greater impact when you can get the goaltender to move laterally or attack from behind the net.
What I want to focus on today is what goes into creating these plays. You might notice one of the stats I highlighted was the frequency of center lane passes vs. cross-slot & behind the net plays. Last year, there were over 2000 shot assists at five-on-five that were from the center lane in the offensive zone (excluding point shot setups). Cross-slot plays occurred only half as often (1049) and while behind the net plays were a little more common (1229), they still happen less frequently overall.
Most teams know what to do in practice, but being able to execute is another thing. That’s why these stats are tracked, because we want to measure skill. Think of how often you’ve seen a play setup like this:
Setting up shop behind the net with either nobody to pass to or trying to force a play through traffic. Sometimes it results in a long sequence where they end up cycling out high (or wherever the open space is). Some teams like to pressure behind the net now while others will leave you alone & protect the house, but the end result is usually a play like this:
It’s a good, close-range scoring chance but not an easy one to finish because it happens quickly in a compressed zone with lots of sticks/bodies to fight through. It’s a style of offense that’s easy to replicate in theory but not in practice, because it’s easier to defend compared to shots that happen off the rush or against the run of play. It also shows the level of skill needed to both create & execute this style of offense because of the limited space teams are presented with here. Looking at who the top players in the league are here shows the level of skill needed.
Sidney Crosby is in a league of his own here & it’s not surprising (especially since Jumbo Joe retired last year). Once you get past him, Matthew Tkachuk & Connor McDavid, there are no players with more than two behind the net assists per 60 minutes. Everyone in the next tier produces at around the same rate & it’s an assortment of top-six players with the odd low-leverage forward also thrown in (although even guys like Gustafsson, Amadio & Foudy had a small positive impact on setting up goals by Hockeyviz’s model, interestingly enough.).
There could also be some team-effects at play here, as Winnipeg, Ottawa & Philadelphia have multiple players near the top of the least. Hard for me to say if this is a system thing or if these players are just good at it, but it is a way to squeeze out some extra offense from your lineup. Incremental improvements are what you’re looking for if this is a team-wide strategy. It’s going to work for some, not so much for others. It’s also just one phase of offense & a small percentage of the overall game.
The Other Phase
Behind the net & cross-slot plays have been bucketed together because they both raise shooting percentage, but threading the needle from a short distance from behind the goal line & making cross-seam passes are different skillsets. The puck travels a further distance & there has to be some level of chemistry and teamwork to pull it off. Whether it’s setting up something off the rush or waiting for a seam to open up, there’s a certain level of precision having to think 2-3 steps head that goes into making this work. This is why they happen less frequently & are more of a boom-or-bust type of play than getting to the middle of the ice or setting up from behind the net.
Which of these two plays do you think is easier to replicate?
This:
or
This?
Both start with a play out of their own zone where they have to take their time to attack with numbers. Both get the defense to back off with a middle lane drive, but Washington is attacking straight down the middle while the Devils attack wide with a middle drive & a winger coming down the left wing to receive a cross-seam pass. Washington defends it well, but it shows how much needs to go right to make this play work even when you successfully put 2-3 passes together.
The play Washington tries is a good attempt too, but it’s a little easier to execute because it’s a drop pass with two players driving the middle & Strome has some space to skate into the shot. It’s a lower percentage play than making a cross-slot pass because he doesn’t have a lot of time to make this shot and it’s 1v1 against an unscreened goaltender from a distance. However, it’s still a higher percentage play than a shot without a pass & easier to complete 5-6 times a game than the play the Devils tried.
A team like the Devils might also get more opportunities per game to make these plays because they have the personnel & they practice it often. Others might only have a couple situations where they can do this because transition isn’t a big part of their game & they just want to get something on net rather than go for the home run play. So, the play Washington tried might suit them more because you’re getting a slightly higher percentage shot & it’s more of a guaranteed attempt at the net than going east-west. It depends if you think getting 10 B-Grade chances is better than 5 Grade A’s.
That said, what was surprising to me was cross-seam passes occurred off the rush & the forecheck/cycle at roughly the same rate. You would think that it would lean more towards the rush or transition, but according to last year’s numbers, there wasn’t any advantage one way or another. This sort of ties into what I mentioned in the last segment. Some teams might not try to go east-west off the rush because it’s risky and it’s easier for them to open up a seam when they’re already setup in the offensive zone.
One player who did well with this was William Nylander. An excellent rush player, Nylander also does a wonderful job at creating space & opening up passing lanes out of nothing plays.
I love this example because it starts with him behind the net & there is nothing open. This is when most teams revert to the point. The Blues are collapsed into the box, so all the space is up there. Instead, he reverses, hands off to Matthews and goes to the point himself, switching spots with Rasmus Sandin, who goes to the net and takes a Blue with him. Matthews then waits and goes to Nylander at the left point & the Blues go out to challenge an oncoming shot. Instead, he makes a very sharp pass to Matthews through the box & the Leafs leading goal-scorer has just enough time to convert on it.
Nylander resetting the offense was the first key to making this happen, but the second pass he makes is the more difficult play where the game-breaking skill is required. There’s a lane open, but he still has to put some velocity on it for Matthews to have any chance at converting. How much of this is player vs. system driven is tough to figure out.
One player who has done this despite switching teams is Kevin Fiala. Fiala led the league in cross-slot shot assists last season in his first year with the Kings & has had one of the highest impact ratings in setting up goals going by Hockeyviz’ model. This is coming after two terrific seasons with Minnesota where he put up similar numbers.
If you subscribe to the “great players will figure it out regardless of linemates” theory, he is your best example. He was moved all over the Kings lineup & was still one of the top playmakers in the league. The most important stat from this chart is that it really doesn’t matter where he’s genreating his offense, as he creates both off the rush and the forecheck. I always try to emphasize balance when talking about this type of stuff & Fiala’s a good example of it, albeit an extreme one.
The flipside of this argument is Jonathan Huberdeau, who went from this in Florida:
To this in Calgary:
I can probably do a whole article on him alone, but “passes from the center lane” being the only passing category that carried over to Calgary is interesting because it’s the easiest one to execute & the one with the lowest shooting percentage. The way he created offense became more one-dimensional because he was getting even fewer puck touches, stopped shooting and the game-breaking, creative side of his game was pretty much non-existent.
High danger passing has shown to be a repeatable skill, but it’s tougher to stay in the elite echelon when you get past 30 so maybe this is who Huberdeau is now. That and linemate chemistry matters more to some than others, especially if you’re not the main puck carrier on your line like Fiala usually is. Next year will tell us more.
Wrapping It Up
There are different tiers of high-danger plays that have their levels of impact.
Creating them off the rush vs. the forecheck doesn’t change the results much & depends on your roster’s strengths. Level of difficulty to create these plays is about the same.
There is a higher risk/reward element to cross-slot passes. More work could be done to measure the risk with missed passes/attempts.
Incremental improvements in the depths of the lineup are still valuable.
Some elite players are “system proof” & others aren’t.